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A Brief Essay on Inclusionary Zoning
and Environmental Values
Donald W. Stever*
"A quiet place where yards are wide, people few .
I. The Picket Fence Origins of Traditional Zoning and its
Exclusionary Biases
When Justice Douglas wrote the now-famous phrase
quoted above as a policy justification for sustaining an exclu-
sionary zoning ordinance's definition of "family" he was artic-
ulating not a new view of the function of zoning ordinances,
but restating the very essence of the zoning scheme promoted
by the Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), adopted in vir-
tually every state, and upheld against constitutional attacks in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.2 The SZEA scheme is
heavily biased in favor of segregating not only residential from
nonresidential uses, but also single-family detached residen-
tial uses from multi-family residential uses, placing the former
at the pinnacle of the "Euclidian triangle." s The source of this
* A Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. Professor Stever also
serves as co-director of the Center for Environmental Legal Studies at Pace. Between
1979 and 1982, he headed first the Pollution Control Section and then the Environ-
mental Defense Section of the U.S. Department of Justice. He is the author of several
publications, including Seabrook and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1980), and
The Law of Chemical Regulation and Hazardous Waste (1986). In addition, he has
written numerous articles on various environmental law topics and frequently lec-
tures on health, safety, and environmental regulatory issues.
The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Brian Nishitani, J.D. 1986,
Pace University School of Law, whose research for a paper written in the course on
Land Use Law provided helpful insight into the Mount Laurel cases.
1. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
2. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The title of this case spawned common usage of the
phrase "Euclidian zoning" to refer to Standard Zoning Enabling Act zoning.
3. SZEA zoning is premised upon the concept that all higher uses may be had as
a matter of right in districts zoned for "lower" uses. Thus, since single-family residen-
1
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bias is nowhere better seen than in Justice Sutherland's lan-
guage in the portion of the Euclid opinion upholding the
practice of segregating single-family from multi-family resi-
dential uses. The court referred approvingly to arguments
that apartments have "[riesulted in destroying the entire sec-
tion [devoted] for private house purposes, '4 that apartments
are often "parasite[s]", and constructed "in order to take ad-
vantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings cre-
ated by the residential character of the district, ' 5 and bring to
residential areas "disturbing noises. '" When placed in resi-
dential districts, apartments, the Court said, "come very near
to being nuisances." I Essentially, what the court is saying is
that apartment houses are alright, so long as they remain in
their place.'
The Supreme Court's Euclid rationale reflects the pre-
dominant urban biases of the dominant economic classes dur-
ing the early twentieth century in the United States. It is also
reflective of the limitations of urban planning and structural
design at that time. The primary reason for segregating multi-
family uses from single-family uses was that not to do so
might inflict some sort of undefined economic (or social) harm
on the single-family residence-owning group9 whose lifestyle
tial (SFR) uses are viewed as the "highest" use. SFR districts are generally exclusive,
but single-family uses are premitted in commercial, multi-family or industrial dis-
tricts. Plotting this pattern graphically results in a triangle.
4. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 395.
8. The trial judge in Euclid viewed the zoning ordinance from a different per-
spective, at least insofar as it segregated residential uses. The District Court opinion
states, in part that "in the last analysis, the result to be accomplished [by such an
ordinance] is to classify the population and segregate them according to their income
or situation in life. The true reason why some persons live .. .in a single-family
dwelling.... and others in an apartment ... is primarily economic." Ambler Realty
Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924). There are, of course, other
reasons why people prefer to live in multi-family situations, and the reasons change
over time with changes in societal attitudes or a person's age.
9. It was also argued at the time that apartments might interfere with air circu-
lation and increase traffic. These concerns, whatever their validity in the 1920's, are
of less consequence today. Development patterns and land development technologies
have changed radically in a number of ways over the last sixty years. In areas such as
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was incompatible with the prevailing multi-family residential
scheme. It must be recalled that at the time Euclid was de-
cided the predominant form of single-family development was
the grid-pattern street layout with individual lots of generally
uniform size containing a dwelling house surrounded by back,
front and side yards. Lot sizes usually varied from 1/10 acre
up to an acre. Low- and moderate-income housing was gener-
ally in the form of tenements or railroad flats, usually built
within close proximity to areas of concentrated employment.
Those who lived in single-family residences were the estab-
lishment classes, while in multi-family situations, the recently
arrived immigrants and other minority groups.1"
II. The Contemporary Rationale For Segregating Housing
Types
It must be understood that the issue discussed in this ar-
ticle is an urban phenomenon. In the truly rural areas of the
United States, most households fall within the low- or moder-
ate-income classifications used in the inclusionary zoning
cases, even though the predominant housing type is single-
family residential. In the farm belt in America's small towns,
inclusionary zoning is simply not an issue. Where it is an issue
is in the older cities and in the country's growing suburban
and exurban areas, where the vast majority of the population
resides.
The reasons advanced currently for keeping low- and
moderate-income housing from areas already developed into
single-family residences, or from essentially undeveloped ar-
eas, are different from the rather straightforward biases of the
1920's. More often than not, environmental concerns have
been voiced as the primary reasons for zoning out multi-fam-
exurban New York, for example, traffic problems have in some cases been exacer-
bated by the failure to integrate various residential uses since workers attracted to
corporate parks located in residential towns, who are unable to afford single-family
residence near their place of employment, clog rural arteries commuting to work. See
Atonna & Counts, New and Innovative Ideas in Land Use Controls - With or With-
out Zoning, Inst. on Plan., Zoning & Eminent Domain 1, 7-11 (1980).
10. Id.
3
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ily or small-lot single-family residential uses." It is usually ar-
gued either that there is a need for open space 2 or that some
resource, like water, would be adversely affected by intensive
development.13
Unfortunately, environmental concerns can easily become
a pretext for less laudable motivations behind large-lot, sin-
gle-family zoning. This is particularly troublesome in light of
the fact that courts when reviewing zoning ordinances since
Euclid, have accorded almost total deference to legislative
findings.14 The courts in New York seem particularly willing
to assume, at least provisionally, that environmental concerns
may form a valid basis for zoning schemes that in general, and
without regard to site-specific environmental constraints,
make little or no room for low- or moderate-income housing.1 5
The validity of this assumption is suspect and needs to be fur-
ther explored by the legal community, the legislature and the
courts with the alternative premise in mind, that adequate
protection of meaningful environmental values can be
achieved without eliminating multi-family and other low/
moderate income housing from rural and suburban communi-
ties. In fact, the failure to accommodate a mixture of housing
types may in some communities actually contribute to envi-
ronmental degradation.
A. Environmental Impacts to be Assessed
Initially, it is important to define as clearly as possible
11. See, e.g., Suffolk Hous. Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 91 Misc. 2d 80, 397
N.Y.S.2d 302 (1977), aff'd, 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1985); North Shore
Unitarian Universalist Soc'y v. Village of Upper Brookville, 110 A.D.2d 123, 493
N.Y.S.2d 564 (1985); Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 51
N.Y.2d 338, 414 N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042
(1981).
12. See North Shore Unitarian Universalist Soc'y, 110 A.D.2d at 124, 493
N.Y.S.2d at 565.
13. Id. at 125, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
14. See Kurzius, 51 N.Y.2d at 340, 414 N.E.2d at 682, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
15. For example, in Kurzius, the New York Court of Appeals stated, "[a]lthough
environmental factors may justify large-lot zoning, we do not hold that this type of
zoning is permissable without qualification, because minimum lot requirements may
involve exclusionary practices." Id. at 346, 414 N.E.2d at 684, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
[Vol. 4
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what is to be considered when dealing with the issue of zoning
premised on environmental concerns. The primary low- and
moderate-income housing forms are now multi-family struc-
tures,16 attached single-family units,17 and mobile homes.18
The relevant question to be asked is whether any of these
housing forms have an inherently more negative environmen-
tal impact than single-family residential housing which is not
affordable by low- and moderate-income persons. In order to
address this question, the types of impacts associated with
human habitation must be addressed separately.
In general, human residential occupation of land areas
will involve the following broad categories of environmental
impact:' 9
(1) water pollution, either of surface waters or ground-
water caused by sewage discharges;
(2) solid waste generation, and the consumption of re-
sources required for disposal;
(3) open space consumption;
(4) destruction or impairment 0 of critical ecosystems;
16. These may be rental apartments that are either subsidized by public agencies
or are not, or condominiums that are priced moderately because they are built pursu-
ant to financing and/or tax incentives designed to keep the price of the units low. See
also Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158,
456 A.2d 390 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
17. As in the case of apartments, these may either be rental units or
condominiums.
18. This term is intended to cover "modular manufactured" homes as well as the
wheeled single unit variety. The modular concept has in recent years come to domi-
nate the industry.
19. I have not listed below, and do not discuss in this article, infrastructure im-
pacts, such as school overcrowding and the costs of increased fire protection, and so
forth. These are not "impacts," so much as fiscal matters. They are, moreover never
legitimate excuses for not developing affordable housing, but are only relevant as to
the timing of growth. In New York, New Jersey and in a number of other states, cash
exactions are available to offset these types of infrastructure costs. See generally D.
Hagman & J. Juergensmeyer, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law,
Section 7.8 (1986)(commentary listed); Hagman, Exactions, User Fees and Assess-
ments: What Are the Limits, in 1983 Zoning and PLanning Law Handbook 45 (F.
Strom ed. 1983); Adelstein & Edelson, Subdivision Exactions and Congestion Exter-
nalities, 5 J. Legal Studies 147 (1976).
20. There are a number of "critical" ecosystems that are generally believed to
require protection. Two examples that have been protected in a number of states and
by the federal government are wetlands and coastal estuaries. Other possible exam-
5
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(5) construction-related impacts such as soil erosion, sedi-
mentation and defoliation;
(6) motor vehicle-related impacts; and
(7) aesthetics.
Whether a given density of habitation will produce undesir-
able effects in any of the above categories is a question of fact
that requires a substantial data base and sophisticated analy-
sis on a town-wide basis. A few communities have attempted
such data gathering and analysis,21 but most operate on only a
rudimentary set of data on the carrying capacity of the town
ecosystems and resources. Thus, for most communities, there
is simply no factual predicate for a large-lot, low-density zon-
ing scheme based on environmental considerations.
1. Water Pollution
Water pollution concerns may be relevant to population
density within a particular geographic area, or to the develop-
ment of a specific site, depending upon the availability of
public sewers. Single-family residences placed on large lots
can usually be served by conventional septic tank and leach
field systems, which use the soil as the primary means of was-
tewater purification.2" Such systems do not work with high
volumes of concentrated sewage, and thus are inappropriate
for apartment dwellings and dense clusters. Such housing
pies may include flood plains, areas of steep slopes, prime agricultural lands, unique
or otherwise valuable forest ecosystems, and areas of historical or archeological value.
See N. Robinson, Environmental Regulation of Real Property §§ 5.01-5.09, 21.03
(1986). See generally J. Kusler, Regulating Sensitive Land 1-53 (1980)(part one of
this book discusses critical areas and zoning).
21. The Village of Upper Brookville, for example, apparently retained a water
management consultant to determine the impact of intensive development on an un-
derlying aquifer that provided the sole source of drinking water for a large area of
Long Island. See North Shore Unitarian Universalist Soc'y v. Village of Upper Brook-
ville, 110 A.D.2d 123, 493 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1985).
22. How large the lot needs to be in order to adequately accomodate subsurface
sewage disposal depends primarily on the soil type and seasonal high water table. In
some soils no matter how large the lot, a septic system simply will not function ade-
quately to prevent ground water contamination. See K. Lynch, Site Planning 181-82
(2d ed. 1971); Bouma, Subsurface Applications of Sewage Effluent, in Planning the
Uses and Management of Land 665-703 (M. Beatty, G. Petersen & L. Swindale eds.
1979).
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types must either be tied into a public sewer system or be
served by a community sewage treatment facility.2" This fact
produces siting constraints for most low- and moderate-in-
come housing types in communities other than heavily urban-
ized ones, and may, in a community without significant receiv-
ing water availability, severely limit the sites available for
large units of such housing.24
2. Solid Waste
Solid waste, unlike water pollution, can never be ration-
ally pointed to as a reason to exclude low and moderate in-
come families from a community. There is no evidence that
low and moderate income families generate more solid waste
than upper income families. In fact, in the United States, the
reverse is probably the case. Moreover, the economics of solid
waste management dictate large, regional facilities, the siting
and operation of which is usually the responsibility of a higher
level of government than the one responsible for zoning and
land use decisions. 5
23. Tying into an existing public system involves construction of pipes, and
sometimes pumping stations. In Westchester County, New York, the county-owned
sewer system is available to about 1/3 of the county's land area. Within the service
area, developers generally pay the costs of extending interceptor sewers to the prop-
erty line, and also build the collector sewers within the development.
Construction of a private sewage treatment facility is much more expensive, and
requires the availability of a stream of sufficient size and water quality classification
to accept the discharge of treated effluent, which under federal and state standards is
generally allowed to contain some pollutants. A few states prohibit the operation of
privately owned sewage treatment facilities entirely, though most allow them, subject
to the conditions of water pollution discharge permits.
24. There are, nevertheless, technologies available for disposing of sewage from
modest sized multi-family developments that do not require expensive treatment
plants and significant receiving water. Chlorinated sand filters and trickling filter sys-
tems have been employed effectively in such situations. See Bouma, supra note 22;
Sopper, Surface Application of Sewage Effluent and Sludge, in Planning the Uses
and Management of Land 633-63 (M. Beatty, G. Petersen & L. Swindle eds. 1979).
25. Although there are still a few "town dumps" here and there, state and fed-
eral regulation of solid waste disposal has caused massive regionalization of this activ-
ity. Today, the county, or, in some areas, a state authority, is responsible for solid
waste disposal.
7
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3. The Open Space Issue
Preservation of open space is the most widely cited rea-
son for large-lot zoning, and also the rationale for the deci-
sions in those New York cases that have upheld zoning
schemes that are facially exclusionary.2 6 The open space issue
accordingly requires careful analysis.
The concept of useful open space does not mean the same
thing to all people. For some, a small garden plot more than
suffices as a window on nature. For others, far more room is
required to satisfy the yearning for unenclosed space. There
are, however, less subjective criteria upon which the value of
open spaces can be assessed.
One such criterion is the value of an area for wildlife pur-
poses." Most species of wildlife seek to avoid human habita-
tion and maintain more stable populations when not in con-
stant close contact to human dwellings.28 Moreover, diversity
of plant associations and terrain types, access to available
water, and similar considerations are important to the mainte-
nance of healthy, diverse wildlife populations.2 Most large-lot
zoning schemes, which spread houses more or less uniformly
over two to five acre parcels, effectively sprinkle humans
26. See, e.g., Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d
338, 346, 414 N.E.2d 680, 684, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 184 (1980). But see, e.g., Mayo,
Land Use Control, 33 Syracuse L. Rev. 401 (1982). The Kurzius decision has been
severely criticized by one commentator, who has pointed out the extent to which it
"suggests the ease with which a community might disguise its discriminatory intent
in euphemistic references to 'open space zoning'." Id. at 409-10.
27. For the purpose of this discussion, it is to be assumed that the wildlife of
concern are larger mammals and most species of bird, which tend to move from one
place to another over time.
28. There are certain timid animals which keep their distance from human ag-
gregation, while others adapt to them. P. Anderson, Omega Murder of the Ecosystem
and Suicide of Man 197 (1971).
29. In any given area various types of microbes, tiny soil organisms, and larger
plants and animals can be found living close together, interacting with one another in
a variety of ways. Often and absolute dependence exists among these species. This
multi-specie system is called a natural community.
The natural community operates within the context of a physical environment.
Physical factors determine, to a large degree, the type of community which comes to
occupy an area. Soil and atmospheric conditions, along with plant types, dictate the
type of community which clothes a region. R. Darnell, Ecology and Man 43-44 (1973).
[Vol. 4
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throughout the entire range of wildlife inhabiting whatever
acreage out of which the development was carved. Dense clus-
ters of habitation,3" on the other hand, coupled with aggres-
sive preservation of undeveloped areas provide greater oppor-
tunities for wildlife.3' It can be argued, for example, that the
adverse impact of pesticide use, which is endemic to back
yards in suburban areas,3" would be far less significant if a
hundred units are clustered into ten or so acres of a two hun-
dred acre tract, than if the same number of units are spread
over the entire tract.33
Even recreational considerations usually favor concen-
trated clusters of habitation over spread-out large-lot zoning.
The development and maintenance of hiking or horseback
trails by a community or a recreational club is clearly more
feasible and cost efficient when there are fewer "owners" to be
dealt with. 34 Weaving a trail system through two hundred
fifty acres of three acre zoned land requires negotiations with
countless lot owners, through whose "close" 35 the proposed
trails must pass. Undeveloped open space associated with a
clustered or apartment development is generally managed by
an owners' association, or by the community, which is a single
owner for negotiation purposes.
The argument most often heard against low cost housing
in rural communities is that apartment houses or dense town
house developments will destroy the rural, idyllic character of
the community.3 While such a statement could be true in
30. N.Y. Town Law § 281 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1987) authorizes cluster zon-
ing. Clustering results in a "grouping of density into a portion of a parcel instead of
uniform density throughout the parcel." P. Buck, Modern Land Use Control 95
(1978).
31. See P. Buck, supra note 30, at 95.
32. For a thorough discussion of pesticide law and regulation see D. Stever, The
Law of Chemical Regulation and Hazardous Waste ch. 3 (1986).
33. Id.
34. In addition, insurance questions, though in no way eliminated, are at least
simpler to address when the trail areas are in single, rather than multiple, ownership.
35. Close is defined as "[a] portion of land, as a field, inclosed as by a hedge,
fence, or other visible inclosure, or by an invisible ideal boundary founded on limit of
title. The interest of a person in any particuler piece of land, whether actually in-
closed or not." Black's Law Dictionary 231 (5th ed. 1979).
36. See Brown, County Effort on Zoning Meets Resistance, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22,
9
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some circumstances (and there are no doubt legions of exam-
ples that could be pointed to by advocates of this point of
view), whether it is or is not true in any given situation, is a
design and site planning issue, and not a zoning issue. As a
practical matter, a good site planner and architect can hide
even a very large structure or complex on most sites of any
significant size, given the topography in most of the eastern
United States.
The failure to accomodate rural character is more often a
product of the unwillingness of local planning boards and
town legislatures to exercise the authority they possess under
subdivision legislation. However, in states like New York,
where "contract zoning" is permitted 37 a town can creatively
use its legislative authority to set conditions which a devel-
oper must meet in order for rezoning to be granted. This au-
thority can be substantial, essentially giving the town the
power to dictate detailed site parameters, mandate close clus-
tering,3" develop and maintain screening,39 impose architec-
tural conditions,4 and the like.
1987, § 11, at 1, col 1. This article discusses the North Salem, N.Y. Town Board's
decision to rezone two areas where multi-family housing was formerly allowed to one-
and two acre residential use. Noted in the article was that the town's potential for
growth was limited because of its environmental setting and rural characteristics,
which made development difficult or impossible.
37. "Contract zoning" is also sometimes called "conditional zoning". It is a de-
vice by which undeveloped tracts are zoned restrictively, but under an ordinance that
allows upzoning under conditions to be established by the legislative body. Since re-
zoning is a legislative, rather than an administrative act, the device provides wide
latitude for the imposition of creative conditions on the developer. See generally Col-
lard v. Village of Flower Hill, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 421 N.E.2d 818, 439 N.Y.S.2d 326
(1981).
38. See generally R. Unterman & R. Small, Site Planning For Cluster Housing
(1977).
39. Screening is typically implemented by means of vegetative buffers and
mandatory rear yard setbacks with fifty to hundred feet either deed restricted to pre-
vent removal of vegetation or, more effectively, deeded to the homeowner association
with a covenent to maintain the buffer.
40. The application of the municipality's zoning authority to impose architec-
tural conditions on the developers, during the early twentieth century, was limited by
the traditional concepts of the time.
Local ordinances early adopted a standard approach for establishing regulat-
ing guidelines as necessary protection of the public well-being through assur-
ing adequate light, air and open space. These regulations, uniformly applica-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/5
1986] ZONING AND ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 165
4. Critical Ecosystems
Critical ecosystem impairment is a site-specific phenome-
non that is to be addressed by restrictive local laws and per-
mit requirements, in the absence of or in addition to state or
federal regulatory requirements.41 Even though a community
contains a significant percentage of critical ecosystem land,
that fact merely affects the location of the development, and
cannot reasonably form the basis for zoning that excludes af-
fordable housing by large minimum lot sizes.
Farmland represents a special problem. More often than
not, farms can be developed, and the only reason they are
viewed as critical areas is that the amount of local farmland,
viewed either as a future resource or a cultural heritage, is de-
creasing. Although there may well be compelling reasons to
prevent development of farmland into non-farm uses,"2 there
is absolutely no logical support for a zoning scheme that fa-
vors single-family residential development of farmland over
multi-family development, or which limits development of
ble throughout each zone district, established allowable heights, set backs,
and building bulk for all construction meeting the permitted use standards.
Atonna & Counts, supra note 9, at 13. However, today "[t]here is no question that
the monolithic city of the early century is gone." Id. at 23. Currently, a zoning ordi-
nance can require that a board approve plans and specifications for structures in or-
der to promote conformity to "minimal architecture standards" and "prevent un-
sightly, grotesque and unsuitable structures." State ex rel Stoyanoff v. Berkley, 458
S.W.3d 305, 310 (Mo. 1970) (ordinance upheld as protecting the general welfare of
persons in the entire community and protecting property values). Cf. Piscatelli v.
Township Committee of Scotch Plains, 103 N.J. Super. 589, 248 A.2d 274 (1968);
Pacesetter Homes v. Olympia Fields, 104 Ill. App. 2d 218, 244 N.E.2d 369 (1968)
(where such ordinances have been overturned on the basis of lack of authority under
state enabling legislature, vagueness of provision contained in the ordinance, and dis-
approval of the function by the architectural advisory committee).
41. Wetland destruction, for example, is heavily regulated by the federal govern-
ment under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, and also by a number of states. For
example, New York has enacted both The Freshwater Wetlands Act, Article 24 of the
Environmental Conservation Law and The Tidal Wetlands Act, Article 25 of the En-
vironmental Conservation. Both New York Wetlands Acts were designed to preserve
and protect wetlands, as valuable resources, and to prevent their despoliation and
destruction. See N.Y. Envt. Conser. L. §§ 24-0103, 25-0102 (McKinney 1984).
42. For the debate on the necessity of preserving farmland, see E. Roberts, The
Law and the Preservation of Agricultural Land (1982); Fischel, The Urbanization of
Agricultural Land: A review of the National Agricultural Lands Study, 58 Land Eco.
236 (1982).
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farmland to large-lot, unclustered projects.4 s
5. Construction-related Impacts
Construction-related impacts are not inherently more or
inherently less significant depending upon the price of the
dwellings being constructed. What is significant, however, is
the total percentage of the site that is under development.
The broader the area of land disturbance, the greater the po-
tential for unavoidable construction impacts, such as sediment
run-off and foliage injury. This fact argues strongly in favor of
tightly clustered developments, which leave large areas of the
tract undisturbed. Furthermore, tightly clustered develop-
ments tend to be attractive to affordable housing developers
since they tend to cost less to develop."" They are thus more
viable in terms of the low profit-margin economics of that
type of project prevalent in the Northeast.
6. Motor Vehicles
Motor vehicle traffic impacts are a common excuse for the
spread out, large-lot zoning. There is no question that poorly
designed traffic patterns or overly dense residential develop-
ments situated on small, rural lands can create havoc. The is-
sue, however, has nothing to do with the nature of the housing
being developed, but simply with gross density per roadway
access point.4" There is no evidence that residential traffic
patterns vary significantly with the income level of the driv-
ers. People generally go to and return from work within the
same general time frames, generating peak traffic flows, re-
gardless of whether they are executives or office workers.
43. It should be understood that I am not arguing in favor of massively dense,
small-lot sprawling affordable housing developments, such as occurred during the
1950's with projects like the Levittowns. Such development is clearly unacceptable by
any standards today. I am simply saying that if the carrying capacity of a given two
hundred fifty acres is "X" dwellings, it is not environmentally better, all other things
being equal, that the dwellings are on large lots.
44. "Cost reduction techniques of mass housing can be properly applied to low-
rise medium-density housing developments". R. Unterman & R. Small, supra note
38, at 1.
45. See Lynch, supra note 22, at 125-29, 149.
[Vol. 4
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What is more important is the direction of travel and the
design and spacing of the ingress and egress points. Virtually
all traffic engineers agree that controlled access is safer than
uncontrolled access, and that the greater the spacing between
access points the greater the margin of safety and the lesser
the potential for congestion. With proper design, traffic vol-
ume decline is significant." There are, of course, limits to the
number of vehicles that will be considered acceptable for any
roadway system, 4  and since road upgrading is expensive, it is
not unreasonable for a town government to consider capping
development at a level below which upgrading needs to be
considered. Such action requires detailed roadway capacity
analyses and is inherently housing-type neutral.
7. Aesthetics
Finally, aesthetics are so site-specific that they cannot
reasonably form the basis for rejection of an inclusionary zon-
ing scheme in any community. Municipalities have broad
powers to impose aesthetic-based standards on land develop-
ments, regardless of their nature or purpose. 8
46. Id. at 148-49. The same does not appear to be as true for commercial devel-
opments, which compress arriving traffic into a much shorter time lens.
47. Id. at 145-46.
48.
Although the design profession has always championed the cause of beauty in
the everyday environment, aesthetic achievements in land development in
the United States has been [termed] meager and limited.... [Though] sym-
pathetic to the cause of aesthetics, the courts initially appeared to favor
health and safety arguments, however tenuous, over aesthetic justifications
for zoning. It took them many years to fully endorse the use of police power
to achieve aesthetic objectives.
Banerjee, Land Use Policy and Value Choice: Environmental Design Perspective, in
The Land Use Policy Debate in the United States 83, 84 (J. de Neufville ed. 1981)
(citations omitted). See also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
"Recently some scholars have suggested that aesthetic welfare is an integral part
of general welfare, and have argued that it must play a major role in social policy
decisions. This argument can also be extended to the area of land use policy .. "
Banerjee, supra, at 83-84. One of the leading cases sustaining land use controls based
on aesthetic considerations alone is People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 240 N.Y.S.2d
734, 191 N.E.2d. 272, app. dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963). This case involved a zoning
ordinance which prohibited erecting clotheslines in front or side yard, abutting the
street. The Stovers had previously erected six clotheslines in their front yard, contin-
13
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
In summary, the use of environmental concerns as a basis
to reject a zoning scheme that affirmatively includes provision
for affordable housing will, in most cases, not withstand close
scrutiny. Most environmental concerns are site, or at most
area-specific, and can be adequately addressed by regulatory
mechanisms that are available to be employed by municipal
officials. 9 Although the authority to mitigate or prevent envi-
ronmental harm exists, municipalities often employ the ex-
isting regulatory tools poorly. Thus, to the extent that there
are examples of environmental degradation resulting from af-
fordable housing projects, they may well be explained as prod-
ucts of timid or unknowledgeable local regulatory action. In
all events, such examples are undoubtedly matched incident
ually adding rags and other unsightly apparel to them as a protest against their taxes.
The court concluded: "[O]nce it be conceded that aesthetics is a valid subject of legis-
lative concern, the conclusion seems inescapable that reasonable legislation designed
to promote that end is a valid and permissible exercise of the police power." Id. at
467, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738, 191 N.E.2d at 275.
A case subsequent to Stover, Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 279 N.Y.S.2d
22. 225 N.E.2d 749 (1967), made it clear that ordinances enacted for aesthetic reasons
alone were permissible in New York. Cromwell cited Stover as "now the leading case"
on the "aesthetics only" rule and rejected prior holdings that required some other
valid police power objective. Note, however, that a majority of courts upholding such
ordinances usually base their determinations on more traditional grounds, in addition
to the aesthetic considerations. See also Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A
New Majority of Jurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. Rev.
125 (1980); Reisel, Aesthetics as a Basis for Regulation, 1 Pace L. Rev. 629 (1981).
See generally, Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (ordinance permit-
ting advertising of on site commercial activity but forbidding other commercial adver-
tising and noncommercial advertising is unconstitutional on its face); State ex rel
Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wisc. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) (case stated that it was immaterial that the sole objective
of the ordinances, which regulated architectual appeal and function, was to protect
property values); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (contained dictum that sug-
gested that aesthetic considerations alone were sufficient basis for the exercise of zon-
ing provisions).
49. In addition to those discussed, a number of state legislatures have adopted
environmental impact review laws that either require or authorize local officials to
require a detailed, written evaluation of the environmental impacts of large projects.
In New York, such a law is codified in the State Environmental Quality Review Act
(SEQRA), Article 8 of the Environmental Conservation Law. SEQRA has existed in
New York since 1976. Similar statutes exist in California, (Cal. Envt'l Qual. Act, Cal.
Pub. Res. §§ 21000-21193 (1986)); Oregon, (Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 468.005-468.480 (198 ));
Michigan, (Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell, Envt'l Protection Act of 1970,
Mich Comp. L. Ann. §§ 691.1201-691.1205 (1987)); and in several other states.
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by incident by examples of gross environmental insults caused
by unaffordable housing developments and commercial devel-
opments, and so argument by anecdote on the issue seems
particularly unproductive.
B. The Mount Laurel Approach to Reconciling Affordable
Housing and Environmental Considerations
The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the relation-
ship between environmental considerations and an affordable
housing doctrine in Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II).50 The court
had, in an earlier decision, Mount Laurel I, stated that a mu-
nicipality could avoid an otherwise mandatory obligation to
provide low and moderate housing opportunities on environ-
mental grounds only if the environmental problems identified
were "substantial and very real,"51 and "reasonably necessary
for the public protection of a vital interest. '52 In Mount Lau-
rel II, the court modified its approach somewhat, stating in
general that otherwise mandated low- and moderate-income
developments can be avoided if they would cause "substantial
environmental degradation. ' 53 The court further explained
what it meant by its general language in two ways. First, it
made it clear that it would exempt from a Mount Laurel obli-
gation any areas listed in the State Development Guide Plan
(SDGP)54 as "conservation areas" or "agricultural areas," as
defined in the SDGP 5 Next, in the two companion cases with
Mount Luarel II, Caputo v. Chester5 and Round Valley v.
50. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
51. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 187, 336 A.2d 713, 731 (1975)(Mount Laurel I).
52. Id.
53. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 331 n.68, 456 A.2d at 479 n.68.
54. The State Development Guide Plan is a statewide plan produced by a New
Jersey state agency, which the court seized upon as its basis for determining which
areas were under sufficient growth pressure to warrant a mandatory obligation to fos-
ter the development of affordable housing.
55. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 231, 456 A.2d at 427. See also Licata & Licata,
The Environmental Implications of Mount Laurel II, 15 Rutgers L.J. 627, 630
(1984).
56. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 309, 456 A.2d at 471.
15
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Clinton,57 the court discussed environmental circumstances in
which it would deny a "builders remedy" to developers who
had otherwise made out a successful Mount Laurel case."
In Caputo, the court denied a builder's remedy to a plain-
tiff whose parcel was in an environmentally sensitive area,
reasoning that the "fair share" obligation did not extend to
such areas.59 Round Valley involved a site located in an area
that clearly would qualify for Mount Laurel treatment, but
which was argued by local officials as environmentally unac-
ceptable for development. The court stated that in such a case
the builder's remedy would be denied if the "appropriate en-
vironmental agency" had passed on the development and
found that substantial environmental damage would result
from the development, or that "sound planning principles"
dictated that the site should not be developed.6
In other places in the opinion, however, the court's sig-
nals were not clear. At one point, the court stated that sound
planning studies calling for open space preservation "may,
under proper circumstances, be sufficient justification for
large lot zoning, including five-acre zoning."61 Yet, elsewhere
within the opinion, it reserved decision as to whether the
Mount Laurel H obligation would "under any circumstances
override" the goals of state critical area legislation designed to
limit growth in the coastal zone and the New Jersey "pine
barrens" areas.2
It would appear that the New Jersey Supreme Court's
difficulty with the interface between its affordable housing
doctrine and environmental protection is a product of the
court's overall approach to the problem of exclusionary zon-
57. Id. at 321, 456 A.2d at 478.
58. The "builder's remedy" involves the court's ordering the municipality to re-
zone the plaintiff's property and issuance of a building permit to allow construction
of complying housing, an extraordinary remedy the court stated should be applied to
Mount Laurel-type cases. The ordinary remedy in successful zoning challenges is re-
mand to the municipality.
59. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 310, 456 A.2d at 471. See also, Licata & Licata,
supra note 55, at 633-34.
60. Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 331, 456 A.2d at 480.
61. Id. at 315, 456 A.2d at 471.
62. Id. at 246, 456 A.2d. at 434.
[Vol. 4
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ing. The court's approach was to impose an obligation on
towns to find a place for low- and moderate-income housing
only if such towns are under growth pressure,"3 thus essen-
tially imposing a sort of judicially created overlay zone on
such communities. Having singled out such areas for special
treatment, the court is left with having to balance two sets of
social priorities in such towns. These priorities are the desire
to accomodate disadvantaged people and the desire to pre-
serve the environment. It thus forces the decisionmaker into
making value judgments about whether the environmental im-
pacts associated with a given level of affordable housing devel-
opment are sufficiently onerous to warrant stifling such devel-
opment and shunting it elsewhere. It has, in a sense, imposed
a Mount Laurel burden on the environment, risking the crea-
tion of a double standard of environmental protection.
It is far from clear whether either the environment or so-
cial justice would prevail in the face of such a difficult conflict
situation, and, at least, the very fact that such a conflict can
be postulated presents an uncomfortable situation. Mount
Laurel did not spring from a conflict between poor people and
the environment or environmentalists. It involved a struggle
between those who have and those who have not.
Had the court taken a simpler approach, ruling that any
zoning scheme which does not permit a mixture of residential
housing types within zoning districts is, per se violative of the
state constitution,6' it might not have been presented with
this problem. Such a ruling would, of course, have struck at
the very heart of the SZEA "Euclidian" zoning hierarchy, and
would have been perceived not only as revolutionary by the
zoning establishment, but, heretical. This is the heart of the
matter.
63. Licata & Licata, supra note 55, at 629.
64. It is not my purpose here to argue the constitutional point, or to argue either
side of the issue of whether inclusionary zoning is required as a matter of social policy
in New Jersey, New York, or anywhere else. That task is left to others. I assume, for
the purpose of this essay, that inclusionary zoning is at least socially desirable, and
am concerned here only with the question of whether such a goal is in any way incon-
sistent with sound notions of environmental conservation. My point of view on this
issue, which should by now be clear, is that it is not.
17
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SZEA zoning, which divides communities into districts of
uniform land uses, has been the dominant land use regulatory
tool in the United States since the 1920's. 6 The New Jersey
Supreme Court was constrained to craft its rulings within the
confines of the SZEA framework, and in so doing produced a
less than satisfying resolution to a serious social inequity.
SZEA zoning imposes a straight jacket upon communities that
contemporary land planning methodology and environmental
awareness has rendered obsolete.
In stepping back and looking at the problem, one is con-
strained to agree with Ian McHarg and his disciples,"6 that
SZEA zoning has seen its day and should be replaced with
something better. McHarg has argued that SZEA zoning is in-
sensitive to valid environmental constraints. 7 SZEA zoning
has also arguably been the vehicle for social injustice, as the
New Jersey Supreme Court so eloquently articulated in
Mount Laurel H.as
The New York courts have thus far rejected the Mount
Laurel approach to the exclusionary zoning problem.69 They
have, however, fallen into the trap of seeking to define some
sort of bellweather standard for imposing upon a municipality
an obligation to do something more, in the way of provision,
65. R. Ellickson & D. Tarlock, Land Use Controls, 36-42 (1981).
66. See I. McHarg, Design With Nature (1969). McHarg states that this book
is a personal testament to the power and importance of sun, moon, and stars,
the changing seasons, seedtime and harvest, clouds, rain and rivers, the
oceans and the forests, the creatures and the herbs. They are with use now,
co- tenants of the phenomenal universe, participating in that timeless yearn-
ing that is evolution, vivid expression of time past, essential partners in sur-
vival and with us now involved in the creation of the future.
Id. at 5. McHarg believes that in urbanizing a particular environmental region, it is
essential for man to determine the capacity of the region to withstand such a change.
The product of man's works should not cause more despoliation than is necessary.
Man must "design with nature." Id.
67. "Where planning does occur, its single instrument is zoning and by this de-
vice political subdivisions are allocated densities irrespective of geology, physiogra-
phy, hydrology, soils, vegetation, scenery or historic beauty." Id.
68. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92
N.J. at 158, 456 A.2d at 390 (1983)(Mount Laurel H).
69. See Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 78
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
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for low- and moderate-income housing, than its zoning ordi-
nance allows.70 New York courts have, as a result of their judi-
cally imposed standards also positioned themselves squarely
before the horns of the dilemma posed by municipalities
which erroneously premise their claim for the right to exclude
lower income people on unsupportable concerns about envi-
ronmental degradation. To date, the New York courts have
not postulated a sound solution for this dilemma.
III. An Approach to Reform
A sounder approach to equalizing access to housing in
suburban areas, albeit one that arguably requires legislative
action, would be the replacement of SZEA zoning with some-
thing more attuned to contemporary environmental planning.
Such an approach should direct that any land use decision-
making process affectuating change start with an analysis of
the environmental limitations of the area. These limitations
should be premised on a complete environmental data base,71
maximum site utilization in terms of density, structural foot-
print, and the like, which would be determined empirically
without regard to the type of residential use contemplated.
Utilizing this type of approach necessitates the result that the
rejection of affordable housing must be accomplished without
70. Id. Berenson placed an obligation on each community in the state to ade-
quately fulfill its present and future housing needs and give consideration to regional
housing needs and requirements in enacting zoning ordinances. Id. at 110-11, 341
N.E.2d at 242-43, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
71. No attempt is made here to describe what such a data base should include.
There are a number of excellent resource inventory computer programs available and
several technical publications. The kinds of data that are important include soil
types, slope contours, water courses, vegetation, rainfall patterns, roadway networks,
the location of collector and/or interceptor sewers, and so forth. See Miller & Nichols,
Soil Data, in Planning the Uses and Management of Land 67 (M. Beatty, G. Petersen
& L. Swindle eds. 1979); Pionke & Kleckner, Hydrolgic Data, in Planning the Uses
and Management of Land 117 (M. Beatty, G. Petersen & L. Swindle eds. 1979); Rust,
Plant Cover Data, in Planning the Uses and Management of Land 143 (M. Beatty, G.
Petersen & L. Swindle eds. 1979); Stoner & Baumgardner, Data Aquistion Through
Remote Sensing, in Planning the Uses and Management of Land 159 (M. Beatty, G.
Petersen & L. Swindle eds. 1979); Neimann & McCarthy, Spatial Data Analysis and
Information Communication; in Planning the Uses and Management of Land 187
(M. Beatty, G. Petersen & L. Swindle eds. 1979).
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the benefit of pretextual environmental obfuscation.72 How-
ever, if the threshold environmental criteria point to severely
limited development, the town should be immune from attack
premised on social policy goals, such as a need for affordable
housing.
It is important to stress that the analytical approach sug-
gested here is not an environmental impact analysis such as
that which occurs under New York's State Environmental
Quality Review Act (SEQRA) 3 or similar statutes. Such stat-
utes require disclosure of impacts on a case by case basis, and
generally produce rather poor products that are premised on
quickly-assembled, inadequate data bases. The approach sug-
gested is more rigorous, and essentially requires establishing a
detailed set of resource maps covering all undeveloped or
sparsely developed areas of the community. Thereafter, the
municipalities, with the assistance of experts, must impose de-
velopment limitations that are both binding and consistent
with the identified resource constraints, on districts whose
boundaries are delineated not by use choices (as they are de-
lineated under SZEA zoning), but by empirically-developed
boundary lines which are premised on commonly applicable
resource constraints. Although such districts could arguably
be layered over SZEA district boundaries,74 it would be far
72. If the environmental carrying capacity is determined initially against a set of
empirically-derived criteria, without regard for the nature of the contemplated use
except in the broad sense, the choices become ones of policy for the municipality.
(Obviously, heavy industrial uses impose different kinds of demands on an ecosystem,
and thus the nature of the use has to be taken into account to some extent. However,
there is absolutely no reason to consider different types of residential use because the
only relevant factors in that situation are the numbers of people and the limitations
on centralized sewage disposal). For example, new growth will require new municipal
services, for example, the municipality will be able to choose between providing the
services, and passing at least some of the cost onto the developer, or not doing so.
The municipality cannot turn down a development simply because it does not wish to
provide services, on unrelated environmental pretexts.
73. See supra note 65. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. L. § 8-0109 (McKinney 1984) re-
quires that state and local government agencies prepare environmental impact state-
ments, and that they choose alternatives which reduce adverse environmental effects.
74. See Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1951),
where an action was brought for a declaratory judgment that town ordinances estab-
lishing a new residence zone were void. Although the ordinance set no boundaries for
the new district and made no changes on the building zone map, it was only a prelim-
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less cumbersome, and much more effective for the districts to
replace the SZEA boundaries. Legislative action may be re-
quired because SZEA-based zoning enabling statutes generally
enable districting only for the purposes set forth in section 1
of the enabling act, 5 and those purposes relate to uses rather
than capacities,76 consistent with the level of understanding in
the 1920s, out of which the SZEA grew.
Conclusion
It is clearly time for change in the process by which local
land use decisions are made, to provide for a more rational
factoring-in of environmental constraints. In some areas, it
may also be time to provide a more receptive climate for af-
fordable housing. What has been outlined briefly in this essay
is just one blueprint for change that may serve to accommo-
date both goals.
inary step in the zoning plan and was thus not invalid.
75. N.Y. Town Law § 261 (McKinney 1965).
76. Section 261 of the N.Y. Town Law states that:
For the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general wel-
fare of the community, the town board is hereby empowered by ordinance to
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and
other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of
yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of population, and the loca-
tion and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or
other purposes ....
N.Y. Town Law § 261 (McKinney 1965).
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